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Recent generalization of the coevolving voter model (J. Toruniewska et al, PRE 96 (2017) 042306)
is further generalized here, including spin-dependent probability of rewiring. Mean field results
indicate that either the system splits into two separate networks with different spins, or one of spin
orientation goes extinct. In both cases, the density of active links is equal to zero. The results are
discussed in terms of homophily in social contacts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the coevolving voter model, an actor placed at a
node of a social network either copies the state of his/her
neighbor, or rewires the link as to connect another node
in the same state as him/herself [1]. In the related
Monte Carlo scheme, this decision is taken by randomly
selected actors. The related probability of rewiring is p,
and the probability of copying is 1− p. In the mean-field
scheme, differential equations have been written [1] as
to evaluate the process averaged over many decisions.
The model is known to be useful for modeling catalytic
reactions and formation of public opinion [2, 3]. In its
standard version, two states of actors are allowed and
the mean degree of a node is uniform [1, 2, 4]. Recently,
the model has been generalized to the case where the
mean degree of a node depends on its state [5]. Here we
present further generalization of the mean field calcula-
tions, where both mean degrees µa, µb and the rewiring
probabilities pa, pb depend on the node states a, b. The
derivation is exactly the same as in [5], then we do
not copy it here; it is only that pa, pb are used instead of p.
Here we are particularly interested in the interpreta-
tion of the action of rewiring as a demonstration of ho-
mophily. According to [6], ’homophily is the principle,
that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher
rate that among dissimilar people’. In Section II we argue
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that both rewiring and state copying have their counter-
parts in social reality. In Section III we provide defini-
tions of the model parameters. Two subsequent sections
(IV and V) are devoted to analytical and numerical re-
sults of the model. In the last Section VI we discuss the
main results.
II. SOCIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
In the process of simulated rewiring, individuals
in both groups show a tendency to limit their social
contacts to their own groups. This conforms to the
Schelling segregation model. Thomas Schelling placed
the separation process in the spontaneous activities of
individuals who want to be surrounded by people similar
to themselves. The effect of these individual choices
was the creation of unintended patterns of separation
in the social structure [7]. As a result, the segregation
between the two groups was the result of relatively mild
individual preferences to live among neighbors similar to
each other. This process was strengthened when staying
with other groups was indifferent or uncomfortable for
the individual [8].
Scheling’s model has been also confirmed in the
situation when group members are open to integration
[9, 10]. The results of analyzes conducted by Junfu
Zhang [11] regarding the spatial segregation process
showed that separation occurs even when the major-
ity of respondents declare that they prefer to live in
integrated districts. This makes it possible to explain
the mechanism of persistence of segregation in societies
that become more and more tolerant [12]. The research
carried out by Fossetta and Dietrich [13] show that
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2segregation processes based on individual choices related
to being surrounded by people similar to each other is so
strong that its occurrence does not depend on structure
of the city in which it happens . In addition, they are
characterized by high durability, because as shown in
[8], changes of individual preferences in this area are
very slow.
Separation processes based on spontaneous actions of
individuals resulting from their individual preferences
regarding being surrounded by similar persons consti-
tute a permanent and important factor causing the
phenomenon of separation in society [14, 15]. They also
affect the social network structures built individually
by actors, which are based not only on the selection of
people who create their nearest surroundings but also on
engaging in interactions with other people in accordance
with their preferences [15]. In this sense, segregation
processes based on the Schelling model are the effect
of the natural tendency of individuals to homophily,
that is, to interact with those who are similar in terms
of certain important characteristics, which has conse-
quences for the structure of the network. As a result,
personal networks of people are homogeneous in terms
of many sociodemographic, behavioral and intrapersonal
traits [6]. The degree of homophily in social networks
influences the level of segregation processes taking place
in them. The higher it is, the stronger the tendencies for
homophily appear in social networks [16]. In this sense,
homophily contributes to solidifying differences between
groups, which deepens the separation between them. In
addition, Golub and Jackson [17] have shown that it
slows down the speed at which society reaches consensus.
Lazarsfeld and Merton [18] distinguished two types
of homophily. The first was related to the status of
the individual (homophily status) and included basic
sociodemographic dimensions that differentiate society,
such as: race, ethnicity, gender, age and acquired
traits, such as religion, education, occupation or specific
behavioral patterns resulting from social status. The
second type of homophily was based on values, attitudes
and beliefs (value homophily). In this perspective the
political orientation is the basis of homophily and can
be a factor conducive to separation, which will result in
isolation among people sharing the same views.
As a result, actors with similar political beliefs will
participate in groups corresponding to their preferences.
In a situation where an individual changes some personal
traits that have so far influenced his membership in
a particular group, eg political orientation, the group
will be changed [19]. This is important for the level
of involvement of the actor in his activity in the new
group. Similar process can be noticed in the case of
conversions, where the people who change affiliation, in
this case religious one, tend to have clear attitudes in
harmony with the new group, often becoming ardent
advocates of a new idea or ideology. This is due, among
other things, to the fact that people - (e.g. converts,
migrants) who lose the frame of reference which so far
have provided them with a social position are attracted
by new ideas that compensate for those they lost [20].
From the perspective of a convert, previous behavior
or belief can be seen as anti-social or felt as a personal
threat, resulting in the creation of a social form imagined
as a community, but formulated as an organization that
excludes immoral and unifies moral, according to new
beliefs [21].
The idea of changing beliefs may be related to the
continuum, where radical and total changes are distin-
guished, based on variations of Nock’s distinction [22]
between conversion and adhesion, to indicate the pos-
sibility of participating in religious groups and rituals
without pursuing a new way of life (in case of adhesion)
[23]. Therefore, converts tend to be closely integrated
with the new group and to identify strongly with it.
III. THE COEVOLVING VOTER MODEL
The medium of our considerations here is a random
network, where nodes can be in two states, say a and b.
It is convenient to call these states as two spin states, up
and down. In the coevolutionary voter model [1], tempo-
ral evolution of the network involves two processes, both
of them driven by an existence of links between nodes
in different states. A randomly selected node either
changes its state as to adopt the state of its neighbor,
or breaks the link and rewires it to join another node,
which is in the same state as itself. It is usually assumed
that these actions are performed with probabilities 1− p
and p, respectively. This dynamics ends up in one of
two kinds of states: either nodes of different states are
completely separated, or there remains some amount of
contact. The order parameter of this transition is played
by the fraction ρ of links between nodes in different
states; they are termed ’active links’. In the former
phase, ρ = 0; in the latter, ρ fluctuates around some
value [1].
The coevolving voter model has been generalized
recently as to allow for different numbers of neighbors
of nodes in different states [5]. The related mean field
model has been delopped in this way; instead of one
differential equation for the density ρ(t) of active links
we got three equations for ρ(t), m(t) and β(t). There,
the variable m is defined as the order parameter of
nodes: m = (Na −Nb)/N , where Na (Nb) is the number
of nodes in the state a (b), and N = Na + Nb is the
number of all nodes. Further, the variable β is defined
as the order parameter of links. Namely, we distinguish
Maa, i.e. the number of links from nodes a directed
towards nodes a, from the number Mab of links from
nodes a directed towards nodes b, and so on. Then, we
3get Maa −Mbb = Nµβ, where µ is the mean number of
neighbors (mean node degree), calculated over the whole
network. Also, Mab = Mba = Nµρ/2. The equations for
m(t) and β(t) have been found to match in such a way,
that a linear combination of these order parameters has
been found to remain constant under time evolution [5].
Also, the subspace defined by the condition β = m has
been found to be invariant: once β happened to be equal
to m, it remains equal forever. All these results have
been confirmed by extensive Monte-Carlo simulations
[5]. Yet both mean field and MC method relied on an
assumption, that the probability p of rewiring does not
depend on the node state.
It is precisely this assumption which is relieved here.
The motivation of this step is the fact that most applica-
tions of the voter model [2] and its coevolving versions [1]
are phenomenological, as competition between species,
opinion formation and catalytic reactions. In such
applications, any symmetry either needs justification
or remains just a simplifying assumption. This is true
in particular in social phenomena, where members of
different groups can react in a measurably different way
on varying external conditions [24, 25]. Our aim is to
explore the coevolving voter model, where pa 6= pb: the
rewiring probabilities are different for different groups.
The method is the mean field approach, as applied in
[1, 5], and the whole approach presented here is a direct
continuation of those papers.
We note that another approach to the voter model
has been aplied recently in [26] from the perspective
of voting dynamics and political campaigns. Although
the formalism applied there is different from applied
here and more focused on game theory, the basic im-
provements of theoretical descriptions are parallel to our
approach. In particular, the dynamics of the network
structure reflects the applied strategies of actors at the
network nodes, and these strategies depend on the node
state.
In the next section we provide the obtained equations
of motion for ρ(t), m(t) and β(t), and a list of symbols
which will be useful for interpretation. Section 3 is de-
voted to the results obtained by the numerical solution of
the equations of motion. In the last section we interpret
these results in terms of social integration.
IV. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We have applied the same scheme of calculation as in
Ref. [5], with distinguishing the rewiring probabilities
pa, pb for different nodes as the only modification. The
obtained equations of motion are as follows:
dρ
dt
= ρ
(
− 2 +m(2− pb) + (1− β)µ(1− pb) + pb
)
(1− β) (1)
+ 2ρ2
(
1−m− µ(1− β)
)
(1− pb)
(1− β)2
+ ρ
(
− 2−m(2− pa) + (1 + β)µ(1− pa) + pa
)
(1 + β)
+ 2ρ2
(
1 +m− µ(1 + β)
)
(1− pa))
(1 + β)2
dm
dt
= − (1 +m)(1− pa)ρ
1 + β
+
(1−m)(1− pb)ρ
1− β (2)
dβ
dt
= ρ
−(1 + β)
(
1−m+ (1− β)µ
)
pb
µ(1− β2) (3)
+
(1− β)
(
1 +m+ (1 + β)µ
)
pa
µ(1− β2)
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this
form of equations, even before they are solved numeri-
cally. First, on the contrary to the case pa = pb consid-
ered in [5], the subspace m = β is not invariant anymore.
Instead, putting m = β in Eqns. (2,4) we get
dm
dt
= ρ(pa − pb)
dβ
dt
=
µ+ 1
µ
ρ(pa − pb) (4)
This means that |m − β| increases in time if initially it
is equal to zero. Further, we might like to reproduce the
condition of stability of the stationary phase ρ 6= 0, as
it was done in [1]. The reasoning is as follows: let us
put dρ/dt in Eq. (2) in the form dρ/dt = ρ(A + Bρ).
The boundary of the stability of ρ = 0 is where A = 0.
Having substituted m = β there, we get a solution
pa + pb = 2(µ − 2)/(µ − 1), what nicely coincides with
the results of [1] obtained for pa = pb. Yet, as shown
just above, the condition m = β is not justified a priori.
In the next section we will analyse the cases where this
condition is fulfilled.
All quantities of interest can be expressed by the three
variables ρ, m and β. In particular, let us denote the
mean degree of nodes a, b as µa, µb. Then we have
µa = µ
1 + β
1 +m
µb = µ
1− β
1−m (5)
4Again, for m = β we get µa = µb = µ; in this limit case
there is no topological difference between the nodes a
and b.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The mean degree µ = 4 is kept for all calculations.
As expected, for pa = pb and initial β = m, both m
and β remain constant and equal to their initial values.
The density ρ of active bonds decreases with p and
vanishes at p = 2/3, which agrees with the formula [1]
pc = (µ − 2)/(µ − 1). The final values of ρ does not
change with the initial values of ρ, yet it depends on the
value of m. To demonstrate this, in Fig. (1) we show
three plots of ρ(p), for different values of m.
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FIG. 1: Three plots of stationary values of ρ(p) for p ≡ pa =
pb and β = m. The plots are made for m = 0 (upper plot),
m = 0.5 (middle plot), and m = 0.8 (lower plot).
In Fig. (2), the data on stationary ρ(p) are presented
for p ≡ pa = pb, β 6= m and various initial conditions. As
we see, a change of the initial value ρ0 of the density of
active links leads to a change of the transition probabil-
ity pc where ρ vanishes, leaving however the stationary
value of ρ unchanged. Further, a change of the initial
values m0 and β0 not only influences the stationary
value of ρ, but also may change the transition character,
continuous to discontinuous or back. This variation is
shown in Fig. (2). Further, as long as the stationary
value of ρ is different from zero, the time evolution drives
the system to m = β, i.e. to the state where the mean
degree of all nodes is the same. However, once ρ reaches
the zero value, the system evolution is frozen and the
values of the order parameters m and β remain different.
In other words, the mean degrees of nodes depend on
the index, a or b. This fact is demonstrated in Fig. (3),
both for continuous and discontinuous transition.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
r o
p
A
B
C
D
FIG. 2: The plots of stationary values of m(p) and β(p) for
p ≡ pa = pb and β 6= m. The plots are made for the initial
data as follows: A (ρ0 = 0.4, m0 = 0.7, β0 = −0.7) , B
(ρ0 = 0.8, m0 = 0.7, β0 = −0.7), C (ρ0 = 0.8, m0 = 0.7,
β0 = −0.2) and D (ρ0 = 0.5, m0 = 0.8, β0 = −0.6).
Our main result is related to the case when pa 6= pb.
Then we get ρ = 0 in all stationary states: the nodes
with spins a are not neighbors of the nodes of spin b.
This outcome may happen within two scenarios: either
m and β get frozen or nodes of a given spin disappear.
The scenario depends on the initial conditions, i.e. the
values of ρ0, m0 and β0. In Fig. (4), examples are
shown of contour maps of m on the plane (pb, pa).
These maps give an insight on the areas where one of
spin orientations is absent or rare. These examples are
shown to demonstrate, that an outcome of the time
evolution depends on the initial conditions. Yet, the
fraction of spins a is always at least 0.1 if pa > pb,
and the fraction of spins b is always at least 0.1 if pb > pa.
In Fig. (5) two examples are shown of the areas where
one of spin orientations is absent. For clarity of the
picture, the surface plots are limited to the cases where
|m| > 0.99. The upper plot is made for the symmetric
system, the same as in the upper plot in Fig. (4). The
lower plot in Fig. (5) is for the same data as the middle
plot in Fig. (4).
In Fig. (6) we show an exemplary dependence of the
stationary density ρ of active links against the positions
in the plane (pb, pa). It is only for pa = pb, where ρ is
different from zero. This result is observed for all initial
states (ρ0,m0, β0).
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FIG. 3: The plots of stationary values of m(p) and β(p) for
p ≡ pa = pb and β 6= m. The plots are made for the initial
data as follows: A (ρ0 = 0.4, m0 = 0.7, β0 = −0.7) , B
(ρ0 = 0.8, m0 = 0.7, β0 = −0.7) (upper figure), C (ρ0 = 0.8,
m0 = 0.7, β0 = −0.2) and D (ρ0 = 0.5, m0 = 0.8, β0 = −0.6)
(lower figure).
VI. DISCUSSION
When we treat the values of the probabilities pa, pb
as strategies of actors at nodes a and b, we see that
the community a will not extinct as long as pa > pb.
Conversely, the community b will not extinct as long
as pa < pb. Once both communities are engaged in
the game and both apply these conditions, both end
at the state where pa = pb = 1, i.e. they separate
immediately, preserving their initial numbers Na, Nb.
Another solution is when one community copies the
rewiring probability p of another community. Then the
results described in Figs. (1,2,3) remain valid.
We note that even in well-organized communities such
collective decisions are rarely conscious. As we discussed
in Section II, the patterns of separated communities
emerge as unintended results of individual decisions.
FIG. 4: Contour maps for the magnetizationm vs the position
on the plane (pa, pb) for selected set of initial conditions: ρ0 =
0.5, m0 = 0.0, and β0 = 0.0 (upper plot), ρ0 = 0.5, m0 = 0.8,
and β0 = −0.6 (middle plot) and ρ0 = 0.5, m0 = 0.8, and
β0 = 0.6 (lower plot). The lines of constant m are made for
m = −0.8,−0.6,−0.4,−0.2, 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8.
Following the classics, we could distinguish between
’community in itself’ and ’community for itself’, to
conclude that the latter is a premature reification [27].
Actually the probabilities pa, pb can be treated as
strategies only within the evolutionary game theory
[28], and not as a conscious decision which optimizes an
expected outcome.
For the modeling within the coevolving voter model,
our results give two insights. First, following [5], we
demonstrate that for pa = pb the final outcome of
the time evolution of the system depends on its initial
state. On the one hand, this result is interesting as
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FIG. 5: The magnetization m vs the position on the plane
(pa, pb) for selected set of initial conditions: ρ0 = 0.5, m0 =
0.0, and β0 = 0.0 (upper plot), ρ0 = 0.5, m0 = 0.8, and
β0 = −0.6 (lower plot). For clarity, the plots are limited to
the areas where |m| > 0.99.
an example of a collective memory in a social network,
which remains out of sight of individual actors. On the
other hand, the effect makes any systematic search of
the model more difficult. It is tempting, for example, to
determine the initial conditions ρ0,m0, β0 which assure
the transition to the frozen state ρ = 0 continuous or
discontinuous. Obviously, such research should be done
for the whole range of the rewiring probability pa = pb.
This task, far from being completed, is only mentioned
here.
Our second insight is related to the case when pa 6= pb.
Paradoxically, in this case the result is more clear: ρ is
equal to zero in all stationary states, unless a non-generic
condition pa = pb is fulfilled. For social interpretation,
this result is disappointing, as it indicates that the co-
existence of communities in mutual contact is not pos-
sible. It is fair to quote David Landes here: ”Where
one group is strong enough to push another around and
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FIG. 6: The density of active links ρ vs the position on the
plane (pa, pb) for selected set of initial conditions: ρ0 = 0.5,
m0 = 0.0, and β0 = 0.0. The result is ρ = 0 except at the line
pb = pa < 2/3.
stands to gain by it, it will do so.” [29]. In game the-
ory, a similar frustration has been raised by the famous
Prisoner’s Dilemma: a proof that in given circumstances,
cooperation is not reasonable for an individual [30]. We
hope that the coevolving voter model will find further
and more constructive generalizations.
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